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1956] NOTES
cent attempt was made to have the Louisiana Supreme Court
eliminate the immunity which it had created, but the court re-
fused to alter its position. 29 Some municipalities have protected
their citizens by taking out liability insurance, thereby waiving
their immunity.30 Such piecemeal action is effective within the
sphere in which it operates, but complete elimination of the
immunity doctrine can come only through legislative enact-
ment. 81
John B. Hussey, Jr.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT - ZONING - EXCLUDING COMMERCIAL
ENTERPRISES FROM INDUSTRIAL AREAS
Plaintiff, intending to construct retail stores, purchased prop-
erty located in an industrial zone of a municipality. After plain-
tiff had applied for a building permit, the zoning ordinance
was amended to restrict the use of property in the industrial
zone exclusively to "light industrial" uses which were not detri-
mental to health, safety, and property, and specifically to ex-
clude residential and retail commercial uses. Plaintiff alleged
that the amendment was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious,
and a deprivation of property without due process of law. The
trial court, sustaining the validity of the ordinance, issued a
summary judgment for defendants. On appeal, the New Jersey
29. Barber Laboratories, Inc. v. New Orleans, 227 La. 104, 78 So.2d 525
(1955). The plaintiffs pointed out in their brief that the Louisiana Civil Code
article 2315 was based on the French Code Civil article 1384 and cited the com-
mentators: 14 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITt TH.tORIQUE PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CivIL 1147, § 2917 (2d ed. 1905) ; 8 HuC, COMMENTAIRE THII0RIQUE ET PRATIQUE
DU CODE CIVIL 598 (1895) ; 20 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 440,
667 (2d ed. 1876), as saying that immunity of municipalities from tort liability
did not exist in France. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1954-1955 Term -Local Government, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 308, 316
(1956).
30. Among the larger cities in Louisiana, New Orleans and Baton Rouge carry
limited insurance, whereas Shreveport carries none (based on letters written by
the author to city attorneys). Cities which own their public utilities generally
carry liability insurance on them, for the operation of public utilities has been
classified as proprietary and the governmental immunity has not extended to
them. Of interest is section 6-303(2) of the Home Rule Charter of the City of
New Orleans: "The City may, without waiver of its governmental immunity, pro-
cure public liability, bodily injury, and property damage insurance covering such
risks and in such amounts as the Council may ordain, provided all such policies
of insurance shall contain a stipulation that the insurer shall not assert the gov-
ernmental immunity of the City as a defense of any suit on such policies."
31. The federal government has paved the way in this direction with the en-
actment of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1952). For suggested
state and local laws, see Borchard, Proposed State and Local Statutes Imposing
Public Liability in Tort, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 282 (1942).
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Supreme Court held, reversed.' Commercial uses are compatible
with the "light industrial" uses in this environment. No "over-
riding" public interest was shown to justify an exception to the
general rule that "higher uses are allowable in less restricted
areas." Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 118 A.2d 824 (N.J.
1955).
Zoning ordinances are presumed to be valid; consequently,
the burden of proof is on the person alleging the unconstitu-
tionality of the ordinance.2 Where there is room for a legitimate
difference of opinion concerning the reasonableness of a zoning
ordinance the courts will not interfere with the legislative judg-
ment.a An ordinance which promotes the public health, safety,
morals, and welfare, and is not unreasonable, will be sustained
as a valid exercise of the police power derived from the state.
4
But, an ordinance reasonable on its face may be unreasonable
in its application to a particular property" Whether an ordi-
nance will be considered an unreasonable restraint on particular
property will sometimes depend upon the differentiation made
between uses permitted and prohibited thereunder.6 If the per-
mitted and prohibited uses are considered very similar, and not
incompatible, an "overriding" public interest will have to be
1. Four of the justices voted to reverse; three dissented.
2. Nectaw v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) ; State v. New Orleans, 154 La.
271, 97 So. 440, 33 A.L.R. 260 (1923) ; 1 ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
LAW § 7.02 (1955); 1 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND CITY PLANNING 539
(3d ed. 1956).
3. Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927) ; Marblehead Land
Co. v. Los Angeles, 47 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1931) ; 1 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZON-
ING AND CITY PLANNING 577, 578 (3d ed. 1956). Courts, however, will regard the
determinations of a municipality much more lightly than determinations of a state
legislature. FORDHAM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT 864 (1949).
4. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) ; State v. New
Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923) ; Stafford v. Caffeyville, 161 Kan. 311,
168 P.2d 91 (1946); 8 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.60 (3d ed.
1956).
5. State em rel. Lorraine v. Baton Rouge, 220 La. 707, 57 So.2d 409 (1952)
(ordinance restricting lowland marsh to residential uses held invalid as applied
to plaintiff on ground that the restriction would deprive property owner of pres-
ent and future use of his property, and restriction had no substantial relationship
to health, safety, welfare, or morals of inhabitants in part of city affected);
Wilkins v. San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d 332, 175 P.2d 542 (1946) ; Forde v. Miami
Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So.2d 642 (1941) (ordinance restricting property to "pri-
vate estate" uses held invalid on the ground that there was no demand for the
property for this use and as a result it would remain unproductive and a source
of expense to owner) ; Palmer v. Detroit, 306 Mich. 449, 11 N.W.2d 199, 202
(1943).
6. Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17, 118 A.2d 401 (1955) (held that there was
enough difference between "motels" and boarding houses to allow a reasonable
differentiation). The dissenting judges in the instant case thought the ordinance
should be sustained on the basis of the Pierro case.
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shown to sustain the validity of the ordinance.7 Zoning ordi-
nances usually exclude less desirable uses from more restricted
areas." It is less common for an ordinance to prohibit more de-
sirable uses in the less restricted areas.9 An ordinance pro-
hibiting residential uses in an industrial area has been held
invalid by the Connecticut Supreme Court on the ground that
there was a demand for residential property and the property
was suited to that purpose.10 The court emphasized the fact
that there was no substantial industry or foreseeable future
development for industrial purposes in the restricted area. A
similar case," involving an ordinance prohibiting "drive-in"
theaters in an industrial area, was held invalid by the Illinois
Supreme Court on the grounds that the restriction was unrea-
sonable as applied to the plaintiff and had no relationship to the
public health, safety, welfare, and morals.
The zoning ordinance in the instant case was enacted for
the purpose of increasing the tax ratables by attracting "light
industries" to the area. The dissenting opinion expressed the
view that these purposes were sufficient to warrant the distinc-
tion.' 2 However, it has been held that a zoning ordinance enacted
for the purpose of assisting a municipality to increase its tax
revenues is invalid.13 The majority of the court in the instant
case recognized that under certain circumstances the validity
of an ordinance excluding higher uses from less restricted areas
might be sustained, but an "overriding" public interest would
have to be shown to prevent the restriction from being unrea-
- sonable as applied to plaintiff. 4 It is possible the presence of
office buildings of several insurance companies and wholesale
7. Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Lear, 128 Fla. 750, 175 So. 537 (1937);
Ronda Realty Corp. v. Lawton, 414 Ill. 313, 111 N.E.2d 310 (1952) ; Chicago
v. Sachs, 1 Ill.2d 342, 115 N.E.2d 762 (1952) ; Page v. Portland, 178 Ore. 632,
167 P.2d 280 (1946).
8. Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 1141 (1954) ; 1 ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 7.05 (1955) ; BASSETT, ZONING 63 (1936).
9. For a list of the municipalities excluding residences from industrial areas
see RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND CITY PLANNING 206 (3d ed. 1956).
10. Corthouts v. The Town of Newington, 140 Conn. 284, 99 A.2d 112, 38
A.L.R.2d 1136 (1953).
11. People ex rel. Trust Co. of Chicago v. Village of Skokie, 408 Ill. 397, 97
N.E.2d 310 (1951).
12. 118 A.2d 824, 833 (N.J. 1955).
13. Dixon v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of Milford, 19 Conn. Supp. 349,
113 A.2d 606 (1955), where it was held that an increase in the tax ratables would
not sustain an exception to the ordinance; Tranfaglia v. Building Commissioner
of Winchester, 306 Mass. 495, 28 N.E.2d 537 (1940) ; 233 Main St. Corp. v. City
of Brockton, 232 Mass. 647, 84 N.E.2d 13 (1948).
14. 118 A.2d 824, 831 (N.J. 1955).
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commercial greenhouses and florists in the affected area in-
fluenced the court in its holding the ordinance to be unreason-
able.15
It is suggested that the court correctly held the ordinance
unreasonable as applied to plaintiff because commercial and
"light industrial" uses are too similar to justify a differentia-
tion in the absence of an "overriding" public interest. 6 Zoning
ordinances should be passed to remedy some existing or fore-
seeable future evil, not merely to result in some remote or specu-
lative advantage to the community.
Burrell J. Carter
REWARDS-COMMUNICATION OF OFFER AND TIME OF ACCEPTANCE
Appellant in an interpleader action claimed a reward for
information leading to the arrest and conviction of the mur-
derer of the offeror's wife. Some months prior to the murder
which gave rise to the offer, appellant, acting as an informant
for the F.B.I., had conveyed data to an agent concerning a
pistol of the type later used in the murder. According to the
appellant's testimony, on the day following a request published
in news reports for information of the nature already given
the F.B.I., he had met the agent, reminded him of the data con-
cerning the pistol, and asked why it had not been given to the
police. The agent, however, testified that he had given the in-
formation to the police prior to their meeting. Held, that since
the appellant had not acted in response to the offer except to
remind the agent that pertinent information collected several
months before the murder was on file with the F.B.I. and, since
rewards are contractual in nature, there was no meeting of the
minds and consequently no acceptance which could give rise to
a contract. The court considered the conflict in testimony to be
of no importance. Sumerel v. Pinder, 83 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1955).
Offers of rewards may be divided into two principal classes:
(a) Those made by private persons or corporations, and (b)
those made by statute or under statutory authority. Reward
offers by private persons are regarded at common law as con-
15. Id. at 828.
16. See Borough of West Caldwell v. Zell, 22 N.J. Super. 188, 91 A.2d 763
(1952), where the reduction of traffic congestion was held to justify the differ-
entiation between auto repair businesses and truck repair terminals.
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